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ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, various improvements have been made to
Tardos’ collusion-resistant fingerprinting scheme [Tardos, STOC
2003], ultimately resulting in a good understanding of what is
the minimum code length required to achieve collusion-resistance.
In contrast, decreasing the cost of the actual decoding algorithm
for identifying the potential colluders has received less attention,
even though previous results have shown that using joint decoding
strategies, deemed too expensive for decoding, may lead to better
code lengths. Moreover, in dynamic settings a fast decoder may
be required to provide answers in real-time, further raising the
question whether the decoding costs of score-based fingerprinting
schemes can be decreased with a smarter decoding algorithm.
In this paper we show how to model the decoding step of score-
based fingerprinting as a nearest neighbor search problem, and
how this relation allows us to apply techniques from the field of
(approximate) nearest neighbor searching to obtain decoding times
which are sublinear in the total number of users. As this does not
affect the encoding and embedding steps, this decoding mechanism
can easily be deployed within existing fingerprinting schemes, and
this may bring a truly efficient joint decoder closer to reality.
Besides the application to fingerprinting, similar techniques can
be used to decrease the decoding costs of group testing methods,
which may be of independent interest.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ DRM; • Theory of computation→
Nearest neighbor algorithms; Sorting and searching.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Digital fingerprinting
Fingerprinting techniques for digital content provide a way for
copyright holders to uniquely mark each copy of their content,
to prevent unauthorized redistribution of this content: if a digital
“pirate” nevertheless decides to publicly share his (fingerprinted)
content with others, the owner of the content can obtain this copy,
extract the fingerprint, link it to the responsible user, and take
appropriate steps. Digital pirates may try to prevent being caught
by collaborating, and forming a mixed copy of the content from
their individual copies, thus mixing up the embedded fingerprint as
well. To guarantee that collusions of pirates cannot get away with
this, collusion-resistant fingerprinting schemes are needed.
Mathematically speaking, collusion-resistant fingerprinting can
be modeled as follows. First, the content owner generates code
words x j ∈ {0, 1}ℓ for j = 1, . . . ,n, corresponding to fingerprints
for the n users, where each of the ℓ columns defines one segment
of the content. Then, a collusion C of c colluders applies a mixing
strategy to their code words {x j }j ∈C to form a new pirate copy y.
Here the critical condition we impose on this mixing procedure is
the marking assumption, stating that if x j,i = b for all j ∈ C, then
also yi = b, for b ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, the owner of the content obtains
y, applies a decoding algorithm toy and all the code words {x j }nj=1,
and outputs a subset of user indices j. This method is successful if,
with high probability over the randomness in the code generation
and mixing strategy, the decoding algorithm outputs (a subset of)
the colluders, without incriminating any innocent, legitimate users.
1.2 Related work
In the late 1990s, Boneh–Shaw [9] were the first to design a some-
what practical, combinatorial solution for collusion-resistant fin-
gerprinting. Their construction based on error-correcting codes
achieved high success probabilities with a code length of ℓ =
O(c4 logn), i.e. scaling logarithmically in the often large number
of users n, and quarticly in the number of colluders c . The mile-
stone work of Tardos [40] later improved upon this with a code
length ℓ = O(c2 logn), and he proved that this quadratic scaling
in c is optimal. Later work focused on bringing down the leading
constants in Tardos’ scheme [8, 15, 16, 19, 30, 32, 38, 39], lead-
ing to an optimal code length of ℓ ∝ 12π 2c2 lnn for the original
(symmetric) Tardos score function [24, 25, 37], and an optimal over-
all code length of ℓ ∝ 2c2 lnn when using further improved de-
coders [12, 15, 21, 32, 33].
The main focus of most literature on collusion-resistant finger-
printing has been on decreasing ℓ – the shorter the fingerprints, the
faster the colluders can be traced. Other aspects of these fingerprint-
ing schemes, however, have received considerably less attention
in the literature, and in particular the decoding procedure is often
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neglected. Indeed, with n users and a code length of ℓ = O(c2 logn),
the decoding time is commonly O(ℓ · n) = O(c2n logn) for linear
decoders, and up to O(c2nk logn) for joint decoders, attempting
to decode to groups of k ≤ c colluders simultaneously. In partic-
ular, past work has shown that joint decoders achieve superior
performance to simple decoders [2, 7, 11, 17, 18, 21, 23, 30], but are
often considered infeasible due to their high decoding complexity.
Moreover, in dynamic settings [22, 26] where decisions about the
accusation of users need to be made swiftly, an efficient decoding
method is even more critical. Techniques that can speed up the
decoding procedure may therefore be useful for further improving
these schemes in practice.
1.3 Contributions
In this work, we study how the decoding method in the score-
based fingerprinting framework can be improved, leading to faster
decoding times. In particular, we show that we can typically bring
down the decoding costs of simple decoders from O(ℓn) to O(ℓnρ )
where ρ ≤ 1 is determined by c and the instantiation of the score-
based framework. This usually comes at a higher space requirement
for indexing the code words in a query-efficient data structure,
although arbitrary trade-offs between the space and query time can
be obtained by tweaking the parameters.
To obtain these improved results, we show that we can model
the decoding procedure of Tardos-like fingerprinting as a high-
dimensional nearest neighbor search problem. This field of research
studies methods of storing data in more refined data structures,
such that highly similar vectors to any given query point can be
found faster than with a linear search through the data. Applying
practical, state-of-the-art techniques from this area, such as the
locality-sensitive hashing mechanisms of [3, 10] and the more re-
cent locality-sensitive filtering of [4, 6], this allows us to obtain
faster, sublinear decoding times, both in theory and in practice. We
give a recipe how to apply these techniques to any score-based
fingerprinting framework, and give an explicit, detailed analysis of
what happens when we use these techniques in combination with
the symmetric score function of Škorić–Katzenbeisser–Celik [37].
To illustrate these results for the symmetric score function, let us
provide some explicit decoding costs for the case of c = 2. We obtain
a decoding time of O(ℓn3/4) without using additional memory;
a decoding cost of O(ℓn1/3) when using O(ℓn4/3) memory; and
a subpolynomial decoding cost ℓno(1) when using up to O(ℓn4)
storage. For larger c the improvement becomes smaller, and in
the limit of large c nearest neighbor techniques offer only minor
improvements over existing decoding schemes – the main benefit
lies in defending against small or moderate collusion sizes.
1.4 Outline.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
first introduce notation, we describe the score-based fingerprint-
ing framework, and we cover basics on nearest neighbor searching.
Section 3 describes how to apply nearest neighbor techniques to fin-
gerprinting, and analyzes the theoretical impact of this application.
Section 4 covers basic experiments, to illustrate the potential effects
of these techniques in practice, and Section 5 finally discusses other
aspects of our proposed improvement.
Table 1: Notation used throughout the paper. The first five
rows indicate how concepts in fingerprinting translate to
concepts in nearest neighbor searching.
FP terminology NNS terminology
n Number of users ∼ n Number of points
ℓ Code length ∼ d Dimension of data
x j Code word ∼ v j Data point
y Pirate copy ∼ q Query point
sj User score ∼ ⟨v j ,q⟩ Dot product
c Colluders α Approximation factor
p Probability vector ρq Query time exponent
д Score function ρs Space exponent
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Score-based fingerprinting schemes
Wefirst recall the score-based fingerprinting framework, introduced
by Tardos [40], and describe the model considered in this paper.
The fingerprinting game consists of three phases: (1) encoding,
generating the fingerprints and embedding them in the content;
(2) the collusion attack, constructing the mixed fingerprint; and (3)
decoding, mapping the mixed fingerprint to a set of accused users.
2.1.1 Encoding. First, the copyright holder generates code words
x j ∈ {0, 1}ℓ for each of the users j = 1, . . . ,n. To do this, he first
generates a probability vector p ∈ [0, 1]ℓ , where each coordinate pi
is drawn independently from some fixed probability distribution F .
In the original Tardos scheme, and many of its variants, a truncated
version of the arcsine distribution is used, which has cumulative
density function F given below.
F (p) := 2
π
arcsin√p. (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) (1)
For small c and the symmetric Tardos score function, certain dis-
crete distributions are known to be optimal [31], leading to a better
performance and shorter code lengths. For large c , these optimal
discrete distributions converge to the arcsine distribution (1).
After generating each entry pi from the chosen bias distribution,
the code words for the users are generated as follows: for each user
j , the ith entry of their codeword x j,i is set to 1 with probability pi ,
and 0with probability 1−pi . This assignment is done independently
for each i and j . These fingerprints are then embedded in the content
and sent to the users. (Note that it is crucial that the bias vector p
remains secret, and is not known to the colluders during the attack.)
2.1.2 Collusion attack. Given a collusion C of some size c , the
pirates employ a strategy θ , mapping their code words {x j }j ∈C to
a mixed copy y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ . Often the attack is modeled by a vector
θ = (θ0, . . . ,θc ), where θk := Pr(yi = 1|
∑
j ∈C x j,i = k). By the
marking assumption, we assume θ0 = 0 and θc = 1.
2.1.3 Decoding. Given y, the content holder attempts to deduce
who were responsible for creating this pirate copy. For this, he
computes scores sj,i := д(x j,i ,yi ,pi ) for some score function д,
and then computes the total user scores as sj :=
∑n
i=1 sj,i . For
well-chosen parameters, the cumulative scores sj are significantly
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higher for colluders than for innocent users. The actual decision
whom to accuse is then made by e.g. setting a threshold z and
accusing users j with sj > z, or by accusing the user with the highest
cumulative score. As an example, the symmetric score function of
Škorić–Katzenbeisser–Celik [37] is given below.
д(x ,y,p) :=

+
√
p/(1 − p), if x = 0 and y = 0;
−√(1 − p)/p, if x = 1 and y = 0;
−√p/(1 − p), if x = 0 and y = 1;
+
√(1 − p)/p, if x = 1 and y = 1.
(2)
2.1.4 Equivalent decoding. Since the decoding step remains equally
valid after linear transformations (i.e. scaling all user scores by a
common positive factor, or shifting all user scores by the same
amount), the following scoring function is equivalent to the sym-
metric score function described above:
дˆ(x ,y,p) :=
{
+1/√p(1 − p), if x = y;
−1/√p(1 − p), if x , y. (3)
To see why, note that the contribution of a segment for the sym-
metric score function, in terms of how far the scores for a match
and a difference are apart, is independent of y:
д(1, 1,p) − д(0, 1,p) = д(0, 0,p) − д(1, 0,p) = 1√
p(1 − p)
. (4)
In other words, as long as the difference between a match and a
difference in segment i is proportional to 1/√pi (1 − pi ) (with a
positive contribution for a match, and a negative contribution for
a difference), this only constitutes a scaling/transformation of the
scores. By scaling the scores by a factor 2, and centering the scores
at 0, we obtain the score function дˆ. (Note that the threshold z will
have to be scaled and translated by the same amounts to guarantee
equivalent error probabilities.)
2.2 (Approximate) nearest neighbor searching
Next, let us recall some definitions, techniques, and results from
nearest neighbor searching (NNS). Given a data set {v1, . . . ,vn } ⊂
Rd , this problem asks to index these points in a data structure such
that, when later given a query vector q ∈ Rd , one can quickly
identify the nearest vector to q in the data set. To measure the
performance of an NNS method, we consider the space complexity
S = O(n1+ρs ) and the query time complexityT = O(nρq ) to process
a query q. Note that a naive linear search, without any indexing
of the data, achieves T = S = O(n) or ρs = 0 and ρq = 1. Ideally a
good NNS method should achieve ρq < 1, perhaps with ρs > 0.
In this paper we restrict our attention to the NNS problem on the
unit sphere, under the ℓ2-norm: we assume that ∥v j ∥ = 1 for all j,
and ∥q∥ = 1. The following lemma states that, if the entire data set
has a small dot product ⟨v j ,q⟩ := ∑dj=1vj,dqj with q, except for
one near neighborv j∗ , which has a large dot product with q, then
finding this unique near neighbor can be done efficiently in sublin-
ear time. The parameter α ≥ 1 below is commonly referred to as the
approximation factor (denoted c in e.g. [4]) – one obtains a sublinear
time complexity for NNS only when either an approximate solution
suffices, or there is a guarantee that the data set contains unique
nearest neighbors which are a factor α closer (under the ℓ2-norm)
than all other vectors in the data set.
Lemma 2.1 (NNS complexities [4]). Suppose that the data points
vi and query q have norm 1, and we are given two guarantees:
• For the nearest neighborv j∗ , we have ⟨v j∗ ,q⟩ ≥ d1;
• For all other vectorsv j , v j∗ , we have ⟨v j ,q⟩ ≤ d0.
Let α =
√
1 − d0/
√
1 − d1 ≥ 1, and let ρq , ρs ≥ 0 satisfy:
α2
√
ρq + (α2 − 1)√ρs ≥
√
2α2 − 1. (5)
Then we can construct a data structure with O˜(n1+ρs ) space and
preprocessing time, allowing to answer any query q correctly (with
high probability) with query time complexity O˜(nρq ).
To achieve the above complexities, at a high level the data struc-
ture looks as follows. Given the normalized data pointsv j , all lying
on the unit sphere, we first sample many random vectors rk on
the sphere, and for each of these vectors we store which vectors
are close to rk in a bucket Bk . The key property we use here is
(approximate) transitivity of closeness on the sphere: if x and y are
close, and y and z are close, then also x and z are more likely to be
close than usual. In other words, ifv j is close to q, andv j is close
to rk (and contained in bucket Bk ), then likely q will also be close
to rk . Therefore, if we create and index many of these buckets Bk
and, given q, we compute the dot products of q with the vectors
rk and only check those buckets Bk for potential near neighbors
for which ⟨q,rk ⟩ is large, then we may only check a small fraction
of the entire data set for potential nearest neighbors, while still
finding all near neighbors. (The actual state-of-the-art techniques
from [4] are slightly more sophisticated. For further details, we
refer the reader to [3, 4, 6].)
Note that Lemma 2.1 only states the scaling behavior of the time
and space complexities, and does not state how large the real over-
head is in practical scenarios. For actual applications of NNS tech-
niques, we refer the reader to e.g. the benchmarks of [5], comparing
implementations of various NNS techniques for their practicality
on real-world data sets, including data sets on the sphere.
3 NEAREST NEIGHBOR DECODING
3.1 Score-based decoding as an NNS problem
To apply NNS techniques to score-based fingerprinting, let us first
show how we can phrase the decoding step of score-based finger-
printing as an NNS problem on the sphere. First, we map the n code
words x j ∈ {0, 1}ℓ to n data points v j ∈ {−1, 1}ℓ by the linear
operationv j = 2x j − 1: a 1 in x j is mapped to a 1 inv j , and a 0 in
x j to a −1 inv j . Next, giveny ∈ {0, 1}ℓ , we map it to a query vector
q as qi = (2yi − 1)/
√
pi (1 − pi ): the entries of q are ±1/
√
pi (1 − pi ),
depending on the value of yi . Note that the Euclidean norms of the
data and query vectors are given by:
∥v j ∥ =
√
ℓ, ∥q∥ =
√√ ℓ∑
i=1
1
pi (1 − pi ) . (6)
To guarantee that all vectors are normalized, we will later have to
scale everything down by ∥v j ∥ and ∥q∥ accordingly. Observe that
with the modified symmetric score function дˆ, the user score sj can
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now be equivalently expressed in terms of dot products as follows:
sj =
ℓ∑
i=1
дˆ(x j,i ,yi ,pi ) =
ℓ∑
i=1
(2x j,i − 1)(2yi − 1)√
pi (1 − pi )
= ⟨v j ,q⟩. (7)
Therefore, a user score sj is large iff the dot product between v j
and q is large, andv j and q are near neighbors in space.
With the above translation in mind, we can now apply the afore-
mentioned NNS techniques. To apply Lemma 2.1, after normaliza-
tion we need to provide two guarantees:
• A nearest neighbor v j∗ (i.e. a code word x j∗ of a colluder
j∗ ∈ C) must have a large dot product with the query vector
q (i.e. must have a high score sj );
• Other neighborsv j (i.e. innocent users j) must have a small
dot product with q (i.e. must have a low score sj ).
For this, we could derive similar proven bounds on Pr(sj > z) for
innocent and guilty users, as previously done in e.g. [8, 25, 37, 39,
40], taking into account that the scores have been transformed.
Instead let us give a slightly informal, high-level description of
what these results may be.
Let H0 be the hypothesis that user j is innocent, and H1 the
hypothesis that user j is a colluder. Let µb = Ep,x j ,y (sj |Hb ) for
b ∈ {0, 1}. By the central limit theorem, cumulative user scores
are distributed approximately normally for large ℓ, and if both
variances σ 2b = Ep,x j ,y (s2j |Hb ) − µ2b are small, we may conclude
that with high probability these scores are closely concentrated
around their means. Then we can estimate the parameters d0 and
d1 for Lemma 2.1, after normalization, as follows:
d0 =
µ0
∥v j ∥ · ∥q∥ , d1 =
µ1
∥v j ∥ · ∥q∥ . (8)
Here the expressions for ∥v j ∥ and ∥q∥ follow from (6). Note how-
ever that both µ0 and µ1 are likely dependent on the collusion attack,
and may not be known in advance, before the decoding stage.
3.2 Two colluders
Let us first investigate the simplest case of c = 2, i.e. having two
colluders. Under the assumption that the colluders work symmetri-
cally, there is no collusion strategy to consider: if they have the same
symbol, they output this symbol, and if they receive both a 0 and a 1
they can choose either with equal probability (i.e. θ = (0, 12 , 1)). For
c = 2 the best choice is to fix pi = 12 for all i , leading to uniformly
random codes. This implies ∥q∥ = 2√ℓ, µ0 = 0 and µ1 = ℓ, resulting
in d0 = 0 and d1 = 12 , as in Table 2. In Lemma 2.1 this leads to an
approximation factor α =
√
2, and a trade-off between the time and
space exponents ρq and ρs of:
2√ρq + √ρs ≥
√
3. (9)
Without increasing the memory (i.e. for ρs = 0), we obtain ρq ≥ 34 ,
i.e. an asymptotic query time complexity for decoding of O(n3/4ℓ).
Setting ρq = ρs we obtain ρq ≥ 13 , i.e. with O(n4/3ℓ) memory, we
can obtain a query complexity of O(n1/3ℓ). With a large amount of
memory and preprocessing time, we can further get a subpolyno-
mial query time no(1)ℓ at the cost of O(n4ℓ) memory.
Table 2: Numerical data for the interleaving attack, using
the optimal discrete distributions of [31]. The last three
columns correspond to three extreme time–space trade-offs:
(I) ρq for ρs = 0; (II) ρq for ρq = ρs ; and (III) ρs for ρq = 0.
c
∥q ∥√
ℓ
µ0
ℓ
µ1
ℓ d0 d1 α I II III
1 2.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.00 ∞ 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 2.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 1.41 0.75 0.33 5.00
3 2.45 0.82 1.36 0.33 0.56 1.22 0.89 0.50 8.00
4 2.45 0.82 1.22 0.33 0.50 1.15 0.94 0.60 15.0
5 2.83 1.26 1.56 0.45 0.55 1.11 0.96 0.68 25.8
6 2.83 1.26 1.51 0.45 0.54 1.09 0.97 0.72 37.6
7 3.16 1.57 1.78 0.50 0.56 1.07 0.98 0.77 57.3
8 3.16 1.57 1.75 0.50 0.56 1.06 0.99 0.79 75.2
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 0 0 1 1 1 ∞
3.3 More colluders
For c ≥ 3, the collusion strategy affects d0 and d1, and the resulting
space and time exponents for the decoding phase. For simplicity, let
us focus on the strongest and most natural attack, the interleaving
attack, where given k ones and c−k zeros in segment i , the collusion
sets yi = 1 with probability k/c (i.e. θk = kc ). Equivalently, for each
segment the colluders random choose one of their members, and
output his content. In that case Epi (yi ) = pi and we can further
simplify the expressions for µ0 and µ1:
µ0 = Ep,x j ,y (sj |H0) = ℓ · Ep
(
p2 + (1 − p)2 − 2p(1 − p)√
p(1 − p)
)
, (10)
µ1 = Ep,x j ,y (sj |H1) =
(
1 − 1
c
)
· µ0 + ℓ
c
· Ep
(
1√
p(1 − p)
)
. (11)
Using the optimal discrete distributions of [31] for small c , opti-
mized for the symmetric score function, and computing the result-
ing parameters, we obtain Table 2. Although the entire asymptotic
trade-off spectrum is defined by Equation 5 and α , we explicitly
instantiate these trade-offs in the last three columns, for the near-
linear space regime (ρs = 0), the balanced regime (ρq = ρs ), and
the subpolynomial query time regime (ρq = 0).
3.4 Many colluders
As one can see in the table, as c increases the time and space ex-
ponents for the decoding phase quickly increase. For instance, for
c = 6, we can obtain a query time complexity scaling as n0.72, with
space scaling as n1.72, or if we insist on using only quasi-linear
memory in n, the best query time complexity scales as n0.97.
For asymptotically large c , using the arcsine distribution with
a cut-off δ > 0 (optimally scaling as δ ∝ c−4/3 [25]), both the
innocent and guilty scores scale such that, after normalization, we
get d0,1 ∝ δ1/4 → 0. The fact that d0 ≈ d1 for large c logically
follows from the fact that colluders are able to blend in with the
crowd better and better as c increases, requiring large code length.
Since d1/d0 → 1, NNS techniques do not give any improvement in
the limit of large c , and the main benefits are obtained when more
memory is available to index the code words, and when c is small.
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4 EXPERIMENTS
To give an example of the potential speed-up in practice, we per-
formed experiments for the interleaving attack with c = 3 colluders.
In total we simulated n = 105 innocent users in each of 1000 trials,
where we used a code length of ℓ = 5000. For the bias distribution
we used the optimal p-values of [31] of p = 0.5 ± 0.289 with equal
weights for both possibilities.
NNS data structure. For the NNS data structure and decoder, we
implemented the asymptotically suboptimal but often more practi-
cal hyperplane locality-sensitive hashing method of Charikar [10].
For the hyperplane LSH data structure, we chose the number of
hash tables as t = 100, and we used a hash length of k = 16 (see [10]
for more details). For each of the t hash tables, each of the n data
vectors is stored in one of the 2k = 65536 hash buckets. Given a
query vector q, for each of the t hash tables we (1) compute k inner
products with random (sparse [1]) unit vectors, with a total cost of
1600 sparse dot products, and (2) do look-ups in these hash buckets
for potential near neighbors (colluders), by computing their scores.
Results. Figure 1 illustrates (running averages of) howmany user
scores are commonly computed, i.e. how much work is done in the
decoding stage, depending on how high the user scores are; the
higher the score sj , the larger the dot product ⟨v j ,q⟩, and the more
likely it is we will find user j (vectorv j ) colliding with q in one of
the hash tables. From 1000 simulations of the collusion process, ap-
proximately 4.2% of all innocent users were considered as potential
colluders (i.e. on average 4200 of 105 user scores were computed),
and over 31% of all colluders were found through collisions in the
hash tables (i.e. on average approximately 1 of the 3 colluders was
found). On average, the decoding consists of computing 1600 dot
products for the hash table look-ups, and 4200 score computations
of innocent users, for a total of around 5800 dot products of length
ℓ. Compared to a naive linear search, which requires computing all
105 user scores, the decoding is a factor 17 faster. This comes at the
cost of requiring 100 hash tables, which each store pointers to all n
vectors in memory; since pointers are much smaller than the actual
vectors, in practice the NNS data structure only required a factor 2
more memory compared to no indexing.
Theory vs. Practice. Theoretically, with t = 100 hash tables we
are using of the order t ·n = n1.40 memory, i.e. setting ρs = 0.40, (al-
though in practice the memory only increases by a small amount).
With c = 3, according to Table 2 we have α ≈ 1.22 for the op-
timal asymptotic trade-offs, which according to (5) would thus
result in ρq ≈ 0.58. In reality the average query cost is comput-
ing 5800 dot products, corresponding to a query exponent ρq =
log(5800)/log(105) ≈ 0.75. In practice, one may indeed notice that
ρq is slightly higher than the theoretical values suggest, but the
memory increase is commonly much less than expected.
Note that although in most runs at least one colluder is success-
fully found in the hash tables (and has a large score), sometimes
none of the colluders are found, and in some applications finding
all colluders may be required. To get a higher success rate of finding
colluders, one could for instance use multiprobing [3] to still get a
significantly lower decoding cost for finding all colluders compared
to a linear search, without further increasing the memory.
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Figure 1: An illustration of (running averages of) howmany
user scores are computed, as a function of the user scores.
5 DISCUSSION
Besides the main analysis on the costs of the decoding method,
and the associated effect on the memory complexity, let us finally
discuss a fewmore properties and aspects of the techniques outlined
in this paper, which may affect how practical this method truly is.
Score function. Although we only explicitly analyzed the applica-
tion to the symmetric score function [37], the same techniques can
be applied to any score-based scheme. For other score functions, the
normalization factor q may depend on the attack strategy however,
making an accurate instantiation of the NNS data structure harder
unless the attack is known in advance.
Effects on encoding and embedding. Even if the decoding method
is more efficient, deploying this method in practice may not be cost-
effective if the method for generating fingerprints and embedding
these in the data needs to be modified. This is fortunately not a
concern here, as the only thing that needs to be modified is how
the owner of the content stores the code words x j for decoding
purposes: the exact same encoding and embedding techniques can
still be used.
Decoding accuracy. One of the main reasons NNS techniques are
fast, is that they allow for a small margin of error in the decoding
procedure. In the application to fingerprinting, this means that the
decoder may not always identify colluders from straightforward
look-ups in the hash tables. This problem can be mitigated with
multiprobing techniques [3, 35], or one could use NNS techniques
without false negatives, such as [34].
Overhead of NNS techniques. With NNS techniques, we reduce
the asymptotic decoding time from O(ℓn) to O(ℓnρ ) with ρ ≤ 1.
Depending on how the hidden constants change, the effects may
not immediately be visible for small n. Note however that the set-
ting considered here, of solving NNS for data on the sphere, can be
handled effectively with practical NNS techniques such as [3, 10],
which have previously been proven to be much faster than linear
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searches on various benchmarks [5], and our preliminary experi-
ments confirm the improvement in practice.
Dynamic settings. For streaming applications [14, 22, 26, 41],
decisions on whether to accuse users or not need to be made in real-
time as well. As the NNS techniques considered here commonly
rely on static data, it is not directly obvious whether the same speed-
ups can be obtained when the data arrives in a streaming fashion.
Interested readers may consider [27, 28] for further reading on NNS
techniques that may be relevant for streaming data.
Joint decoding. While simple decoders with a decoding cost lin-
ear in n might be considered reasonably efficient, in the joint decod-
ing setting, the decoding cost of O(ℓnk ) for k ≥ 2 is a real problem.
Similar techniques can be applied there, by slightly changing how
the decoding problem is modeled as a near neighbor problem. In
that case, the decoding time becomes O(ℓnkρ ), and the improve-
ment may be even more noticeable than for simple decoders.
Group testing. As discussed in e.g. [20, 21, 23, 29, 36], the group
testing problem of detecting infected individuals among a large
population using simultaneous testing [13], is equivalent to the
fingerprinting problem where the collusion strategy is fixed to
the all-1 attack: whenever allowed by the marking assumption,
the colluders output the symbol 1. Similar techniques as described
above can be applied there to reduce the decoding time complexity
both for simple and joint group testing methods.
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